The theories of time consciousness have primarily sought to account two types of phenomena. The first is our experiences of temporally extended events, such as change, motion, and succession. Assuming that we can have experiences of succession, for example, the main explanations for these experiences fall into two categories, namely to extensionalist and retentionalist models of specious present. Specious present refers to the idea that (subjectively speaking) our experiences are temporally extended -an idea that both theories subscribe. However, extensionalist models furthermore maintain that experiences, one specious present, is objectively speaking temporally extended too, whereas retentionalist models reject this claim. One way to express this difference is to say that according to extensionalist models an experience of succession requires a succession of experiences, while such claim is rejected by retentionalist models.
The second explanandum concerns the continuous flow of our experiences. According to William James, our stream of consciousness is not chopped up into separate bits. Most philosophers agree with James at least if the claim is taken to be that we have an experiential state at each moment during some interval (say during the time we are awake). That is to say that there are no gaps in the stream of consciousness. Assuming that one specious present can follow another without any delay, and there is no obvious reason why this could not hold, then all extensionalist and retentionalist theories are compatible with this version of continuity thesis. Agreeing with James, Barry Dainton argues, however, for a more demanding version of continuity according to which our stream of consciousness is indeed gapless, continuous, but in addition we can experience the continuous stream of consciousness itself. The continuity is something that is experienced and (we agree with Dainton that) the mere continuous stream of contents is not enough to establish this. Crucially, Dainton argues that only his overlap model of specious present, a version of extensionalist models, can accommodate the strong continuity. Consequently, Dainton concludes that retentionalist model of specious present and the continuity of the stream of consciousness is erroneous.
In this paper, we argue however that Dainton's overlap model has the result that either we do not have experiences of succession or that we can experience succession without having a specious present where one item succeeds the other. Given that both of these results contradict the extensionalist model of specious present, the overlap model turns out to be inconsistent. As a result, this necessitates a reevaluation of Dainton's arguments related to the continuous flow of experiences. We end by considering two alternatives: (i) the possibility that the strong version of continuity does not hold, in which case the issue of continuity cannot be used to reject different models, and (ii) providing a version of retentionalist model that can accommodate the strong continuity.
